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Introduction
At the Tenth Biennial Conference 
on the Biology of Marine Mammals in 
November of 1993, Alexey Yablokov 
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ABSTRACT—In 1948, the U.S.S.R. be- 
gan a global campaign of illegal whaling 
that lasted for three decades and, together 
with the poorly managed “legal” whaling 
of other nations, seriously depleted whale 
populations. Although the general story of 
this whaling has been told and the catch 
record largely corrected for the Southern 
Hemisphere, major gaps remain in the 
North Pacific. Furthermore, little attention 
has been paid to the details of this system or 
its economic context.
Using interviews with former Soviet 
whalers and biologists as well as previously 
unavailable reports and other material in 
Russian, our objective is to describe how 
the Soviet whaling industry was structured 
and how it worked, from the largest scale of 
state industrial planning down to the daily 
details of the ways in which whales were 
caught and processed, and how data sent to 
the Bureau of International Whaling Statis-
tics were falsified.
Soviet whaling began with the factory 
ship Aleut in 1933, but by 1963 the indus-
try had a truly global reach, with seven 
factory fleets (some very large). Catches 
were driven by a state planning system 
that set annual production targets. The 
system gave bonuses and honors only 
when these were met or exceeded, and it 
frequently increased the following year’s 
targets to match the previous year’s pro-
duction; scientific estimates of the sus-
tainability of the resource were largely 
ignored. Inevitably, this system led to 
whale populations being rapidly reduced. 
Furthermore, productivity was meas-
ured in gross output (weights of whales 
caught), regardless of whether carcasses 
were sound or rotten, or whether much of 
the animal was unutilized.
Whaling fleets employed numerous 
people, including women (in one case as 
the captain of a catcher boat). Because 
of relatively high salaries and the poten-
tial for bonuses, positions in the whaling 
industry were much sought-after. Catching 
and processing of whales was highly mech-
anized and became increasingly efficient as 
the industry gained more experience. In a 
single day, the largest factory ships could 
process up to 200 small sperm whales, 
Physeter macrocephalus; 100 humpback 
whales, Megaptera novaeangliae; or 30– 
35 pygmy blue whales, Balaenoptera 
musculus brevicauda. However, process-
ing of many animals involved nothing 
more than stripping the carcass of blub-
ber and then discarding the rest. Until 
1952, the main product was whale oil; 
only later was baleen whale meat regularly 
utilized.
Falsified data on catches were routinely 
submitted to the Bureau of International 
Whaling Statistics, but the true catch and 
biological data were preserved for research 
and administrative purposes. National 
inspectors were present at most times, but, 
with occasional exceptions, they worked 
primarily to assist fulfillment of plan targets 
and routinely ignored the illegal nature of 
many catches.
In all, during 40 years of whaling in the 
Antarctic, the U.S.S.R. reported 185,778 
whales taken but at least 338,336 were 
actually killed. Data for the North Pacific 
are currently incomplete, but from pro-
visional data we estimate that at least 
30,000 whales were killed illegally in this 
ocean. Overall, we judge that, worldwide, 
the U.S.S.R. killed approximately 180,000 
whales illegally and caused a number of 
population crashes. Finally, we note that 
Soviet illegal catches continued after 
1972 despite the presence of international 
observers on factory fleets.
(then Special Advisor for Ecology 
and Health to Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin) revealed that the Soviet Union 
had conducted a vast global campaign 
of illegal whaling that began in 1948 
and lasted three decades (Yablokov, 
1994). Yablokov described how the 
U.S.S.R., while in theory bound by 
the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling, 1946 to which 
it was a signatory, had swept the seas 
in search of whales, routinely disre-
garding quotas, prohibitions, and other 
regulations established by the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission (IWC). In 
general, violations took three forms: 
the taking of protected species, altering 
of reported biological data to camou-
flage catches of under-sized animals or 
lactating females, and over-reporting 
of “legal” species to provide credible 
catch totals.
Although some uncertainty remains 
about the true number of the U.S.S.R.’s 
catches during this period, the differ-
ence between what was actually caught 
and what was reported to the IWC1 
was large (Clapham and Ivashchenko, 
2009). These catches, together with 
the poorly regulated whaling of other 
nations, drastically reduced the popula-
tions concerned, and in at least one case 
(that of the eastern population of the 
North Pacific right whale, Eubalaena 
1Catch data were actually reported to the Bureau 
of International Whaling Statistics, which was 
the central repository for such data under the 
IWC.
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japonica), may have irreversibly dam-
aged a population’s chance of recovery.
In the years following Yablokov’s 
revelation, various papers have pro-
vided the details of these illegal catches. 
Due largely to the efforts of some 
Soviet biologists who had preserved 
formerly secret materials from that 
period, most of the falsified data for the 
extensive Soviet whaling operations 
in the Southern Hemisphere have now 
been replaced with true catch numbers 
(Yablokov, 1995; Zemsky et al., 1995, 
1996; Yablokov et al., 1998; Mikhalev, 
2000, 2004; Clapham and Baker, 2002). 
Attempts have also been made to cor-
rect the record for the North Pacific 
(Yablokov and Zemsky, 2000), but this 
remains incomplete and large gaps exist 
for some species.2
The general story of Soviet ille-
gal whaling has now been told by a 
number of authors (Yablokov et al., 
1998; Ivashchenko et al., 2007; Berzin, 
2008; Clapham and Ivashchenko, 
2009). However, with the exception of 
some information in a posthumously 
published memoir by the Soviet whale 
biologist Alfred Berzin (2008), there 
has been little recounting of the details 
of Soviet whaling operations, or of the 
economic context in which this industry 
operated. Here, we use available pub-
lished material (primarily in Russian) 
together with extensive interviews of 
former Soviet biologists and whalers to 
describe how the Soviet whaling indus-
try was structured and how it worked, 
from the largest scale of state industrial 
planning down to the daily details of the 
ways in which whales were caught and 
processed by the factory fleets, and how 
the crews of these fleets were managed 
and paid. We also describe the method 
by which catch data were falsified in 
reports to the IWC.
Materials and Methods
Our objectives were to understand 
the primary mechanisms of the Soviet 
industrial planning system and their ap-
plication to the whaling industry, and to 
investigate the details of how whaling 
2The North Atlantic was the one ocean where the 
U.S.S.R. did not operate.
was conducted. This required a review 
of materials that are primarily in Rus-
sian, including books and the formerly 
secret scientific, production, and inspec-
tion reports of the whaling industry, as 
well as information available on various 
websites devoted to whales or whaling 
in Russia and Ukraine. We also reviewed 
Soviet reports to the IWC. However, the 
majority of information was derived 
from interviews, as described below.
Interviews
Extensive information about Soviet 
whaling was gathered from interviews 
with a number of individuals who had 
formerly held positions in the Soviet 
whaling industry. These included scien-
tists as well as former captains or other 
crew members of whaling vessels and 
(in one case) an artist who had been as-
signed to a shore whaling station in the 
Kuril Islands. The interviews covered a 
variety of topics ranging from everyday 
operations and working conditions to 
submission of catch reports and dealings 
with the Ministries and administration; 
they also included personal details of the 
interviewees’ lives and careers. The full 
interviews will be published separately, 
but brief biographies of the major inter-
viewees are given below.
Vyacheslav Alexseevich Zemsky, 
Ph.D., born in 1919, worked as a whale 
biologist aboard the factory ships Aleut, 
Slava, and Yuriy Dolgorukiy, starting in 
1946. For many years, Zemsky worked 
in the VNIRO3 laboratory in Moscow 
and in AtlantNIRO (the Kaliningrad 
branch of VNIRO), studying whales 
and seals. He was one of the first Soviet 
scientists to propose that the pygmy blue 
whale is a separate species (although 
today it is considered a subspecies, 
Balaenoptera musculus brevicauda). 
He is one of the leading marine mammal 
scientists in the former Soviet Union; 
Zemsky participated in the disclosure 
of true data for the Soviet catches and 
was a coauthor of a number of papers on 
that topic. He now lives in Moscow and 
was interviewed in April 2008.
3VNIRO stands for the Vserosiyskiy Nauchno-
issledovatel’skiy Institut Ribnogo khozyaistva i 
Okeanographii (All-Union Research Institute of 
Fisheries and Oceanography).
Dmitriy Dmitrievich Tormosov, 
Ph.D., born in 1937, worked as both 
a biologist and a national whaling in-
spector aboard the factory ships Yuriy 
Dolgorukiy, Slava, and Sovetskaya 
Rossia at various times between 1961 
and 1974. Tormosov kept more than 
57,000 individual catch records (so-
called “whale passports,” see below), 
primarily from the Yuriy Dolgorukiy 
fleet, and these have been used to con-
struct an extensive true catch record 
for Soviet whaling in the Southern 
Hemisphere. Tormosov has published 
or coauthored many papers on Soviet 
whaling statistics or the biology of 
whales. He lives in Kaliningrad, Russia, 
but was interviewed for this study in 
Odessa in October 2008.
Nikolai Doroshenko, Ph.D., born 
in 1938, started his work as a marine 
biologist on board the whaling factory 
ship Vladivostok in 1963 in the North 
Pacific. In various years until 1975 he 
participated in scientific studies on 
the Dalniy Vostok, Vladivostok, and 
Sovetskaya Rossia. For many years he 
worked in the TINRO laboratory (the 
Pacific branch of VNIRO in Vladivo-
stok). He was on board when Soviet 
fleets were working in the Gulf of 
Alaska and in the southeastern Bering 
Sea, and he later revealed the truth 
about the Soviet operations in these 
areas, notably with regard to the fleets’ 
destruction of North Pacific right 
whales. He retired from his position in 
TINRO and still lives in Vladivostok. 
He was interviewed in St. Petersburg in 
September 2006 and again in Vladivo-
stok in November 2009 and May 2011.
Grigori Georgievich Derviz, born in 
1930, is an artist who in 1955 worked 
as a research assistant on the land whal-
ing station at Paramushir in the Kuril 
Islands. Although he subsequently 
became a highly respected artist (and 
a member of the Russian Academy of 
Arts), Derviz had a great interest in 
biology, and spent much of his time 
at Paramushir making drawings and 
paintings of whales and the whaling 
process, and of the men and women 
who worked there. He was interviewed 
at his home in Moscow in October 2008 
and again in November 2009.
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Figure 1.—The first Soviet factory ship, the Aleut. Photo: Alfred Berzin.
Other minor details of whaling op-
erations were obtained from interviews 
with former whalers (primarily in 




Origins and Global Expansion
Commercial whaling by the U.S.S.R. 
had its origin in 1932 with the conver-
sion of the American cargo vessel Glen 
Ridge into a 5,055 gross ton (GT) whal-
ing factory ship which was renamed 
Aleut (Zenkovich, 1954; Berzin, 2008).5 
The Aleut (Fig. 1), together with three 
steam catcher boats, began whaling 
operations in 1933, initially hunting 
5The first modern whaling vessel in (pre-revo-
lutionary) Russia was the Mikhail (3,643 GT), 
purchased in 1903 by Count Heinrich Hugovitch 
Keyserling together with three steam catchers 
for his operation in the Russian Far East. The 
Mikhail was seized during the Russo–Japanese 
War of 1904–05.
6Although Soviet whaling in the Antarctic began 
in 1946, Norwegians were present on board Slava 
for the first two seasons; thus, illegal catches did 
not begin until the 1948/49 season.
7Formerly Empire Venture (UK), Wikinger (Ger-
many), and Vikingen (Norway) (Anonymous, 
1954). Slava sailed for the Antarctic on 22 
December 1946 and began whaling operations in 
January the following year.
4Note on sources: Facts and information in this 
paper that are not cited or footnoted are derived 
by the authors from the interviews with Soviet 
biologists and others mentioned in the text.
the then-abundant baleen and sperm 
whales, Physeter macrocephalus, in 
the coastal waters of Kamchatka and 
Chukotka. In 1946, after the end of the 
Second World War, the U.S.S.R. added 
a second factory ship and began opera-
tions on baleen and sperm whales in the 
rich whaling grounds of the Antarctic6; 
this was the Slava7, which at 12,639 GT 
was bigger than the Aleut and attended 
by a larger fleet8 of between 8 and 15 
catchers (Anonymous, 1954; Bulkeley, 
2010). Also at this time (from 1948), the 
Soviet Union began to use five former 
Japanese land whaling stations along 
the Kuril Islands, with catchers that 
were converted World War II American 
corvettes (Fig. 2).
Additional expansion of the whal-
ing industry did not occur until 1959 
when, during three consecutive seasons 
(1959–61), the Soviets added a new 
factory ship each year to their Antarctic 
operations; these included two large, 
purpose-built sister ships, Sovetskaya 
Ukraine and Sovetskaya Rossia, as well 
as the Yuri Dolgorukiy, which was a 
converted passenger liner. The Sovets-
kaya Ukraine and the Sovetskaya Rossia 
8The term “fleet” here refers to the collection of 
vessels (catchers, scout boats, etc.) working with 
a specific factory ship (e.g. “the Slava fleet”).
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(32,024 and 33,154 GT, respectively) 
were the largest whaling factory ships 
ever built. Finally in 1963, two new 
large factory ships named the Vladivo-
stok and the Dalniy Vostok were added to 
pelagic whaling operations in the North 
Pacific. Thus, Soviet whaling expanded 
from its modest coastal beginnings with 
the Aleut in 1933 to a global operation 
encompassing seven factory fleets and 
several land stations, across much of the 
world’s oceans. Details of each whal-
ing fleet or land station, including its 
years and areas of operation, are given 
in Table 1.
Soviet Industrial Planning: 
The Target Plan System 
and Its Application to  
the Soviet Whaling Industry
Soviet whaling was a government-
owned and government-controlled in-
dustry.9 In the beginning, the Ministry 
of Food and Light Industry was re-
sponsible for licensing, enforcement 
of laws and regulations, prosecutions, 
and all communication activities re - 
Table 1.—List of all whaling fleets and land stations operated by the Soviet Union. The number of catchers in opera-
tion varied, and catchers would sometimes move around between different factory fleets.
Fleet/station name Home port Years operated Areas of operation No. of catchers
Aleut	 Vladivostok	 1933–1967	 North	Pacific	 3–8
Kuril	land	stations	 Kuril	Islands	 1948–1964	 western	North	Pacific	 12–15
Slava	 Odessa	 1946–1966	 Antarctic	 	 8–23
	 Vladivostok	 1966–1969	 North	Pacific
Sovetskaya Ukraina	 Odessa	 1959–1975	 Antarctic		 15–25
Sovetskaya Rossia	 Vladivostok	 1961–1980	 Antarctic	 15–25
	 	 	 North	Pacific	
Yuriy Dolgorukiy	 Kalinigrad	 1960–1975	 Antarctic	 15–17
Vladivostok	 Vladivostok	 1963–1978	 North	Pacific	 10–13
Dalniy Vostok	 Vladivostok	 1963–1979	 North	Pacific	 10–13
10Gosplan is the acronym for Gosudarstvennoe 
Planirovanie, which means “State Planning.”
lated to whaling by the U.S.S.R. 
(IWC, 1953). Later, a separate Min-
istry of Fisheries was established and 
put in charge of the fishing and whal-
ing industries. As with everything 
in the U.S.S.R., whaling was based 
upon a system of production targets 
set by the industrial plans created by 
the State Planning Committee of the 
Council of Ministers (Gosplan10). 
These targets defined bonuses (as 
well as privileges, awards, and other 
recognition) in the system. The re-
sponsibilities of the State Planning 
Committee were described by Sysoev 
(1974) as follows:
11“Disproportions” here means excessive pro-
duction, beyond that which would be required 
for distribution, or for integration of component 
parts into a particular industry. For example, the 
intent could be to avoid making too many wheels 
for automobile production plants, beyond the 
number that they could use in their production 
target of cars. However, it is worth noting that, in 
whaling, “disproportionate” production occurred 
regularly, despite the lack of demand for many 
of the products. 
12Here and with quotations elsewhere, transla-
tions from the original Russian into English were 
made by the senior author.
Figure 2.—A converted American corvette used as a whale catcher at the Kuril 
Islands shore whaling stations. Painting by Grigori Dervis, 1955.
“Gosplan is in charge of long-
term and current planning on a 
national scale, and it also controls 
the progress made in the fulfilment 
of economic plans, especially with 
regard to the main indicators, and 
prepares measures to avoid the 
emergence of disproportions.”11,12
Industrial plans set 5-year, 1-year, 
and monthly production targets. Upon 
meeting these targets (monthly, and at 
the end of the season each year), workers 
would receive a 25% bonus above their 
regular salary; exceeding the target by 
20% would increase the bonus to 60% 
of the workers’ pay. This created an 
obvious and strong incentive for catch-
ing more whales. Furthermore, because 
of this system (and the fact that fleet 
workers were provided free food for 
months at a time), whaling potentially 
paid among the highest salaries of any 
industry. As a result, employment was 
very competitive, and it was difficult to 
obtain a position in the fleets.
Salary bonuses were calculated based 
upon monthly production. For example, 
if workers exceeded the monthly target 
in January by 20–60% but did not meet 
the target in February, they would re-
ceive their bonus for only 1 month. As 
9The description given here is of necessity a sim-
plification of what was in reality an immensely 
complex bureaucratic system with numerous ele-
ments and hierarchies.
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Figure 3.—The Soviet target plan system and bon- 
uses. Bonuses were paid for meeting and exceeding 
the production target, and the following year’s target 
was then generally set at 100% of the current year’s 
production (although this changed with population 
declines in later years). Figure 4.—The Soviet factory ship Slava returning to her home port 
of Odessa at the end of its 12th Antarctic whaling season (1957–
58). The banners advertize the success of the fleet in exceeding 
production plan targets (and note that the season was dedicated to 
the “40th anniversary of Soviet Ukraine”). Photographer unknown.
a result, whalers would not slow their 
pace of work even if they had had a very 
productive time at the beginning of the 
season. If the overall total for the entire 
season exceeded target thresholds, an 
additional bonus was paid. 
The system of plan targets worked in 
different ways. A 5-year target was set 
at the beginning of the period and would 
not be changed, but a new 1-year target 
would be set annually; how this target 
was calculated varied considerably from 
year to year. In some instances, the new 
year’s target would be based upon 100% 
of the previous year’s productivity; 
an example involving the Sovetskaya 
Rossia fleet is given below. In other 
years, targets were increased but at a 
lower rate, and without any obvious 
connection with the whaling results of 
the previous year. In the Soviet fishing 
industry, targets were frequently set by 
taking the actual average Catch Per Unit 
Effort (CPUE) for the present year and 
multiplying it by the number of vessels 
in the fleet (Sysoev, 1974); it is likely 
that a similar system was sometimes 
used to calculate whaling targets (with 
catcher CPUE as the metric), but we 
cannot be certain.
However targets were calculated, 
the result was that, in order to receive 
a bonus (at least in the years prior to 
depletion of populations), the whalers 
had to kill more whales than in the previ-
ous year to meet the new target. A sim-
plified scheme of targets and bonuses is 
illustrated in Figure 3. The actual system 
was considerably more complicated. 
Multiple targets were set, involving not 
only the number of whales to be killed, 
but also gross output, as well as a list of 
specific products; examples from two 
factory fleets are given in Table 2. Meet-
ing or exceeding these various targets 
led to additional bonuses.
We could find only one instance in 
which a Soviet whaling fleet exceeded 
the yearly catch or gross output targets 
by 20% (the Dalniy Vostok fleet obtained 
121% of their allotted target in the 1967 
season), which would have triggered a 
60% salary bonus (Fig. 3); however, we 
examined reports from only the North 
Pacific together with a few Sovetskaya 
Rossia reports for the Antarctic.
A consequence of this system was 
that, because the initial 5-year target 
remained unchanged, whalers could, 
by exceeding each year’s annual target, 
attain catches that were several times 
the 5-year target. Such success was 
routinely reported with great fanfare 
in the Soviet media, and factory ships 
themselves would sometimes advertise 
this on returning to port at the end of a 
season (Fig. 4). In terms of the exploita-
tion of the resource, however, the result 
Table 2.—Example of plan targets and actual results for particular whaling products for two factory fleets 
(all weights are in tons). Figures are taken from Soviet production reports for the two fleets/seasons concerned.
 Sovetskaya Rossia	1961/62	 Dalniy Vostok 1964
   % of the   % of the
Item Plan target Actual plan target Plan target Actual plan target
Total	output	(raw	weight)	 128,500	 141,938.6	 110.4	 97,000	 112,733.5	 116.2
Food	blubber	 20,430	 20,607.9	 100.9	 11,300	 9,164.4	 81.1
Medicinal	blubber	 570	 1,146	 201.1	 850	 1,020.4	 120
Technical	blubber	(highest	quality)	 4,070	 5,026	 123.5	 2,285	 7,599.7	 332.6
Technical	blubber	(secondary	quality)	 280	 0	 0	
Spermaceti	 1,000	 522.3	 52.2	 670	 1,742.3	 260
Blubber	total	 26,350	 27,302.2	 103.6	 16,405	 19,526.8	 119
Food	meat	frozen	 2,000	 3,545.1	 177.3	 900	 1,501.8	 166.9
Frozen	meat	for	animals	 1,900	 1,842.2	 97	 1,950	 1,727	 88.6
Meat	total	 3,900	 5,387.3	 138.1	 2,850	 3,228.8	 113.8
Bone	meal	 5,100	 5,491	 107.7	 5,130	 6,402.9	 113.3
Frozen	liver	 690	 808.5	 117.2	 ?	 ?	
Sperm	whale	teeth	 3	 0	 0	 4.5	 1	 22.2
Ambergris	 	 0.0186
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of catches that increased every year 
was that the whaling rapidly became 
unsustainable.
Catch setting, and use of natural re-
sources generally, was supposed to be 
based upon scientific assessments and 
rational management, as explained in 
an exposition of the socialist economy 
and its basis (Sysoev, 1974):
“Science is one of the main features 
of planning . . . Many scientific 
institutions in the U.S.S.R. partici-
pate in the solution of the problems 
facing the planned development of 
the socialist economy.”
The same publication has a chapter 
entitled “Measures to safeguard fish 
stocks,” and this discusses the main 
tasks of the Principal Administration 
for the Preservation and Reproduction 
of Fish Stocks, and the regulations 
(overseen by the Ministry of Fisheries) 
of fishing and other marine resource 
exploitation, including whaling. These 
tasks included:
“To safeguard fish stocks, work 
out and implement measures to 
reproduce and regulate fisheries in 
the water bodies of the U.S.S.R. . . .  
To draw up proposals for limits on 
catches of valuable commercial 
fishes [and] marine animals . . . co-
ordinating them with the relevant 
main administrations of the Min-
istry of Fisheries of the U.S.S.R., 
research institutes and organiza-
tions of the fishing industry, and 
submitting them for approval.”
Despite this, in reality exploitation of 
marine resources was based almost en-
tirely upon economics or the ambitions 
of officials. The opinions of scientists 
(who were required to analyze whale 
population dynamics and recommend 
sustainable catch levels) were routinely 
and usually completely ignored. 
For example, the Ministry of Fisher-
ies gave a target for gross output for the 
1961–62 season of Sovetskaya Rossia 
as 128,500 tons; actual results for that 
season were 141,938.6 tons (exceeding 
the target by 10.4%). The following 
season the target for gross-output was 
set as 138,150 tons, with an actual pro-
duction of 153,985.4 tons (exceeding the 
new target by11.5%). In both seasons the 
target was exceeded because of whaling 
success in the North Pacific; as a result, 
the Sovetskaya Rossia’s production 
target for this area was doubled, from 
12,320 tons in 1962 to 24,150 tons in 
1963.
Routine inflation of targets was exac-
erbated by other factors. For example, 
in years in which certain important 
national events were celebrated (which 
was frequently: e.g. the anniversary of 
the October revolution, the 130-year 
anniversary of Bellingshausen’s trip to 
Antarctica13, etc.), whalers would usu-
ally make a counter-proposal to increase 
their allotted targets by some amount 
of product. Alexei Solyanik (1952), the 
infamous and most successful whaling 
fleet commander of all (Sakhnin, 1965; 
Berzin, 2008), wrote in his descrip-
tion of Slava’s first five seasons in the 
Antarctic:
“Soviet whalers named the fifth 
Antarctic season after Stalin. In 
their letter to Comrade Stalin, 
the crew of the fleet committed 
themselves to exceeding the target 
plan for whale oil by 30 thousand 
poods14.”
In contrast, failure to meet targets was 
punished. In addition to potentially not 
receiving a bonus, under-performing 
captains or other officers could be de-
moted, and workers rated poorly would 
not be rehired the following season. 
Furthermore, the teams or individuals 
deemed responsible for compromising 
production were sometimes named 
in reports. Here is a quotation from 
13Fabian Gottlieb Benjamin von Bellingshausen 
(1778–1852) was a Russian naval officer who, 
during an expedition to circumnavigate the globe 
in 1820, reportedly made the first sighting of the 
Antarctic continent. See Bulkeley (2010) for an 
interesting discussion of how this was later used 
to bolster Soviet territorial claims in the Antarc-
tic, with ties to the first Antarctic expedition of 
the Slava whaling fleet.
14A pood is an old Russian measure of weight 
equal to 16.8 kg or 37 lb. Accordingly, the 
increase involved here would be by 504,000 kg 
or 504 t.
the production report of the whaling 
fleet Vladivostok for the 1965 season 
(Anonymous, 1965a), commenting on 
the poor output of two catcher boats:
“The failure to meet the monthly 
target [for May] by the catcher 
Vliyatel’niy was related to poor 
coordination between Captain V. 
I. Klepikov and the harpooner G. 
N. Stasenko, and also neglecting of 
teamwork. The failure to meet the 
target on the part of Robkiy can be 
explained solely by the neglect and 
passiveness of the crew.”
Likewise, the production report of the 
whaling fleet Dalniy Vostok for the 1965 
season (Anonymous, 1965b) berates the 
harpooners of two catchers, but also 
points to a more systemic problem:
“The catchers Velichaviy and 
Vazniy did not meet their monthly 
target. Both vessels had a deficit 
mainly because of poor work by 
the harpooners . . . During June 
the catches often exceeded the 
processing ability of the factory 
ship and this led to catchers losing 
time waiting for carcass delivery, 
and a long holding time for the 
whale carcasses before processing. 
Because of the reasons described 
above, less than half of the whale 
products were able to be frozen and 
that resulted in the monthly target 
of frozen products not being met.”
In fact, such wastage was a common 
problem in Soviet whaling. One spe-
cific and rather confusing parameter of 
the plan targets was that productivity 
was calculated in gross output and not 
in final (net) products. The reason for 
this lay within the Ministry’s reporting 
system; the whaling industry was placed 
together with the fisheries industry and 
their annual reports were reviewed to-
gether using the same system of evalua-
tion. The problem was that gross output 
in fisheries (measured as the weight of 
whole fish) is similar or almost equal to 
the final net product output (the weight 
of processed fish). This is not the case 
for whaling, where much or most of the 
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huge bulk of each whale was discarded. 
Yet this system allowed whalers to 
record catches (and therefore produc-
tion) as the total calculated weight of all 
whales caught, rather than the amount 
of product produced.15 
In reality, the actual amount of prod-
ucts that were processed was a second-
ary goal. The net production depended 
upon the condition of the whale (from 
fresh to rotten) when it was brought 
back to the factory ship. Capture of large 
whales (such as blue whales, Balaenop-
tera musculus, and fin whales, B. physa-
lus) would yield very large production 
numbers, even if the amount of products 
actually processed from them might be 
low. Further details of processing and 
the use of different parts of whales are 
described below.
Target plans for each fleet were set 
individually. In addition, there was a 
competition between the fleets for the 
largest catch during each season. All 
these factors drove Soviet whalers to 
kill more and more whales, notably 
as they gained more experience, and 
as new and larger factory ships were 
introduced. Indeed, to have “the largest 
in the world” for everything was a major 
characteristic of Soviet political mental-
ity, and this was manifest in the whaling 
industry in the building of the huge 
Sovetskaya Ukraina and S. Rossia. This 
was originally meant to demonstrate the 
superiority of communism over capital-
ism with the ability of “free” people to 
attain great results; in reality it resulted 
in factories, farms, ships, institutes, and 
other entities that were designed and 
built with the primary goal of being 
the largest in the world, with efficiency 
and sustainability often being, at best, a 
secondary afterthought.
In summary, the Soviet planning 
system—and calculation of produc-
tion targets—was in theory based 
upon principles of sustainable use and 
scientific recommendations or assess-
15Since whales were usually too large to weigh, 
this figure was based upon a standard table 
of length and weight for different species by 
months. This table was available on each fac-
tory ship, and it was based upon calculations 
by Kleinenberg and Makarov (1955) using data 
from the early years of operation of the Aleut.
ment of resources, and this represented 
one of many prominent claims by the 
U.S.S.R. in the political war against 
capitalism. In reality it devolved into 
an unregulated system which, for many 
industries, consumed natural resources 
with considerable waste (Ericson, 1991; 
Berzin, 2008). This was exacerbated by 
the fact that its output was not based 
upon genuine economic needs or na-
tional demand, nor was it constrained 
by the need to show profits.
Structure of the 
Soviet Whaling Fleets
The Aleut was the first Soviet whaling 
factory ship, and was a relatively small 
operation. However, beginning with 
the Slava in 1946, Soviet factory ships 
became larger, with larger fleets of faster 
and more powerful catcher vessels (Fig. 
5). This capital expansion required more 
workers, larger plan targets, and more 
whales. The selection of workers was 
very rigorous, and most positions were 
very competitive. There were require-
ments of good health and experience; 
in addition, other characteristics were 
important, such as being a communist 
or politically active, married with a 
Figure 5.—A catcher from the Slava fleet. Photographer unknown.
family, and having no criminal or any 
other compromising records. At the 
same time, Soviet industry (including 
whaling) was quite progressive in that 
it employed significant numbers of 
women (see below).
While at a minimum the factory fleets 
required enough people to perform the 
main job (killing and processing enough 
whales to meet and exceed plan targets), 
each Soviet factory ship was in effect a 
small country away from the homeland. 
Each fleet had many subdivisions to 
support various aspects of the industry, 
and this resulted in an overall crew 
complement that was large. The two 
largest factory ships, the Sovetskaya 
Ukraina and the Sovetskaya Rossia, 
each had about 560 people on board, 
not including the crews of the catchers 
(some 25–31 seamen for each), making 
in total more than a thousand people in 
each fleet. 
Among the divisions of the fleet were 
the whaling departments themselves, 
which included the processing teams 
and blubber boiling factory staff, as well 
as workers responsible for storage. Then 
there was the chemistry lab, and opera-
tion of the galley and laundry. In addi-
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tion, each fleet had a newspaper printed 
on board (Fig. 6)16, a school, a library, 
a cinema and an accountants office, as 
well as a large command group.
A notable feature of Soviet whaling 
fleets was the presence on board of a 
relatively large number of women. They 
served not only as cooks and laundry 
workers, but also as scientists, radio op-
erators and, in one case, even the captain 
of a catcher. This latter individual was 
Valentina Yakovlevna Orlikova, who 
commanded the catcher Storm during 
1947–53; in 1943 Orlikova was promi-
nently featured in Soviet propaganda for 
Figure 6.—The newspaper Kaliningradskiy Kitoboy (“Kaliningrad Whaler”) that 
was printed on board the factory ship Yuriy Dolgorukiy. Photographer unknown.
Figure 7.—Valentina Orlikova, who 
became the only known female cap-
tain of a whale catcher. The photo-
graph is from a magazine cover in 
1943; she commanded a catcher 
from 1947 to 1953.
16On the Aleut the newspaper was called Har-
poon, on the Slava the Soviet Whaler, and on the 
Yuri Dolgorukiy the Kaliningrad Whaler.
her previous posting as an officer in the 
merchant marine (Fig. 7).17
Scientists were present on all but one 
of the factory ships: the Aleut did not 
have a scientific group for a number of 
years because of a shortage of trained 
whale biologists in the Vladivostok lab-
oratory, which was supplying scientists 
to three other whaling fleets from the 
same home port. The Kuril land whaling 
stations had scientists from the Moscow 
institutes only periodically.
Overall the position of scientists on 
board was widely viewed by other crew 
members as useless with regard to the 
end result of production, and science 
17http://letopisi.ru/index.php/Валентина Яковл 
евна.
was tolerated largely because, in the 
words of biologist Dmitriy Tormosov, 
“Everyone else had science, so we 
should too” (personal commun., Octo-
ber, 2008).
The command system on Soviet whal-
ing fleets was quite complicated. Each 
fleet was led by a group of five people. 
The overall command of the fleet lay 
with the Captain-Director. Next in rank 
was a Commissar (political officer), 
followed by a First Vice-Captain (or 
Relief Captain) who was responsible for 
directing and overseeing whale catches. 
There was also a Vice-Captain in charge 
of whale processing and production, and 
a Chief Engineer. Each factory ship had 
an additional special post termed the 
“Engineer of Whaling.” This man was 
responsible for plotting the daily posi-
tions of the catchers and whale catches 
on a map, and organizing the collection 
of whale carcasses to be brought back 
to the factory ship for processing. At the 
end of the whaling season, the Engineer 
of Whaling was primarily responsible 
for falsifying catch data (see below).
A national whaling inspector was 
present on each factory ship to (in 
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theory) oversee the enforcement of 
whaling laws and regulations (e.g. 
the prohibitions on taking undersized 
whales, lactating females, or protected 
species); this was required under the 
International Convention for the Regu-
lation of Whaling 1946, to which the 
U.S.S.R. was a signatory. The inspection 
system is discussed further below.
Salaries
The salary system in the fisheries 
industry of the Soviet Union was quite 
complex. In a textbook for universities, 
Sysoev (1974) described details of the 
system, which was developed in the 
1950’s to:
“differentiate and regulate the level 
of wages of different groups and 
categories of workers, depending 
on the quality of their labor, work-
ing conditions, and skills, as well 
as on the specific features and im-
portance of the various industrial 
branches and enterprises, and on 
their disposition.” 
In the whaling industry, each person 
earned a basic salary based upon his or 
her qualifications and position. How-
ever, this salary could be increased, 
notably through a system of regional 
wage coefficients; these multiplied the 
salary by a coefficient depending on 
where the fleet was working, the under-
lying logic being that work was harder in 
some areas than others. For the Antarctic 
below latitude (lat.) 40°S the coefficient 
was 2.0. For North Pacific regions it 
varied from 1.6 to 2.0: for north of the 
Bering Strait, as well as the Kuril and 
Commander Islands the coefficient was 
2.0, while it was 1.8 for Kamchatka and 
northern Sakhalin, and 1.6 for southern 
Sakhalin (Sysoev, 1974). The catchers 
associated with a whaling fleet regularly 
operated at a considerable distance from 
the factory ship, sometimes 200 nmi or 
more away; in some cases, this could ac-
tually put them in a different wage zone 
for a day (e.g. if they ventured north of 
lat. 40°S). As a result, for the purpose 
of paying salaries, the daily position of 
the factory ship was used for the entire 
fleet. Once the factory ship was below 
lat. 40°S, this would result in an increase 
in everyone’s salary, regardless of where 
they might otherwise be. The higher 
coefficient, as well as the potential for 
production bonuses, was the reason most 
of the seamen wanted to go quickly to 
the Antarctic without any delay in areas 
north of lat. 40°S.
Additional bonuses were based on 
monthly individual/team production 
and depended on the number of whales 
caught, the amount of oil produced, the 
number of whales processed, etc. The 
basic bonuses for meeting or exceeding 
the plan target applied to everyone in the 
fleet, but certain other bonuses related to 
specific elements of production were not 
given to scientists, or to other workers 
not involved in the actual catching and 
processing of whales. Whaling inspec-
tors, however, would receive all types 
of bonuses. Salaries were calculated and 
reported to whalers weekly or monthly, 
and were paid every month to the fami-
lies at home (Kotlyar, 1952).
The Whaling Process
A detailed description of the process 
of Soviet whaling and the research 
conducted on whales can be found in a 
number of Soviet publications, primar-
ily from the early period of the industry 
(Arsen’ev and Zemskiy, 1951; Kotlyar, 
1952; Zenkovich, 1954; Sleptsov, 1955; 
Solyanik, 1956). Not surprisingly, these 
descriptions omit all mention of the il-
legal aspects of the whaling. Instead, one 
finds many stories about the heroic hard 
work and dedication of many people 
working together to meet a target plan 
and to help the homeland with critically 
important products from the whales 
that they killed; this aspect of whaling 
was publicized widely both inside and 
outside the Soviet Union. Below, we 
describe the details of the whaling itself.
Killing and Towing Whales
Once in the whaling area, catchers 
would often form a front spreading out 
in a line with a distance between two 
catchers of about 8–10 nmi; this was 
based on the assumption that one catcher 
could see whales within a radius of about 
10 nmi. Once this front was formed, the 
catchers would begin to search. They 
would be in radio contact with the fac-
tory ship and usually with each other, 
keeping the fleet captain fully aware of 
catcher actions and results. This way 
each fleet would cover a large area in 
a very efficient way.18 When whales 
were found, catchers would begin the 
hunt, with multiple vessels sometimes 
converging on an area where whales 
were concentrated.
For each catch, the catcher crew (or 
scientist if one was aboard) filled out 
the front side of a special document 
called a “whale passport” (Fig. 8). This 
logged the number of the passport, the 
date, catcher’s name, harpooner’s name, 
time the hunt (chase) began, whale 
species, position and time of the kill, 
approximate distance to the factory ship, 
behavior of the whale during the hunt, 
number of whales seen in the beginning 
and if possible the direction of their 
movements, the presence of plankton 
patches (shape, size, and color), pres-
ence of other animals (species and 
number of birds, seals), beginning time 
that the whale was under tow, time of 
delivery to the factory ship, and any 
additional comments from the captain 
or harpooner. Not all of the details were 
filled out every time, but a suite of es-
sential data was required.
Killed whales were either put “on 
flag” for later pick-up (a pole with a 
flag was inserted into the carcass, which 
had been inflated with compressed air 
to prevent it from sinking; Fig. 9), or 
were immediately towed by the catcher. 
Whenever a whale was put “on flag” its 
position and some other details of wind 
and current direction would be reported 
to the factory ship to enable its subse-
quent recovery by either a “tag boat” or 
by one of the catchers themselves at the 
end of the day. One or two of the catch-
ers would usually help the tag boat to 
collect killed whales. Very few flagged 
whales were lost, since this would result 
in a loss of productivity.
18An example is given by Mikhalev (1997): in 
early November 1966, the Sovetskaya Ukraina 
fleet entered the Arabian Sea from the Gulf of 
Aden, then proceeded north along the coast of 
Oman and across to the coasts of Pakistan and 
northwestern India. Their catchers swept the area 
and killed 238 humpback whales in 10 days.
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Figure 8.—Whale passport (front and back), the document filled out on the factory 
ship’s processing deck; the form recorded catch and biological information on each 
killed whale. This passport is for a 12.6 m male southern right whale (Eubalaena 
australis) killed in the Kerguelen islands region on 10 February 1963. Photo: Dimi-
triy Tormosov.
Figure 9.—Whales “on flag.” The 
carcasses have been marked for later 
pickup and towing to the factory 
ship. Photo: Nikolai Doroshenko.
Much of the time, catchers would 
commonly be spread over a large area 
and could range as far as 200 nmi 
from the factory ship (or even more in 
extreme cases). A “front” of 20 catch-
ers could be spread out over 200 nmi, 
especially in areas where there was no 
prior information on whale distribu-
tion. However, towing a whale back to 
the factory ship from a long distance 
resulted in many whales arriving already 
rotten, and thus unsuitable for process-
ing. When catchers could not find many 
whales near the factory ship, one of the 
catchers would be sent searching for 
other aggregations of whales, ranging 
up to 600 nmi away (Kotlyar, 1952).
Competition between catchers and 
fleets, as well as the need to fulfill 
monthly targets, forced catchers to 
continue hunting, even in bad weather. 
After the first few years of Soviet whal-
ing, catchers reportedly could be found 
hunting whales in poor weather condi-
tions, thus maintaining high catches 
when foreign fleets might return with 
unfulfilled quotas (Kotlyar, 1952). 
The same incentive inevitably resulted 
in Soviet catchers being encouraged 
to take whale species that were il-
legal to hunt (such as southern and 
North Pacific right whales, as well as 
gray, Eschrichtius robustus; bowhead, 
Balaena mysticetus; and, later, blue and 
humpback whales) and later also to hunt 
other baleen and sperm whales outside 
permitted seasons, areas, or quotas (see 
also the Appendix).
Processing
The butchering (flensing) process 
was very organized and efficient, and 
sometimes a staggering number of 
whales were processed in a 24-h period. 
The processing deck of each factory 
ship (Fig. 10) was divided into two 
parts. The rear processing deck was 
dedicated to stripping a whale of its 
blubber and removing the lower jaw and 
tongue. After being hauled up the stern 
slipway of the factory ship (Fig. 11), a 
whale would first be placed on the rear 
deck and the blubber rapidly removed 
(typically in 10–12 min, Kotlyar, 1952). 
While the carcass underwent this ini-
tial processing, the second side of the 
whale “passport” was filled in, mainly 
by scientists, who recorded the number 
of the whale (assigned in order from 
the beginning of the whaling season), 
the date and time the whale was hauled 
onto the processing deck, sex, length, 
blubber thickness, presence of a fetus 
and/or milk (for mature females), length 
and sex of a fetus, internal and external 
parasites, fullness and contents of the 
stomach, and any additional informa-
tion of note. 
At the same time, the whale was 
recorded in a journal (a registry of 
catches) with similar but less detailed 
information; typically, this was done by 
a seaman on the processing deck.
After initial processing, the whale 
was moved to the central part of the 
processing deck. There, a separate 
flensing team separated the head, cut off 
the meat, removed bones and internal 
organs, and put all useful parts of the 
animal into boilers or into a line for 
processing bone-meal.
The whole process of butchering a 
whale would take about 30 min from 
beginning to end. One of the major 
drivers of such efficiency was the “so-
cialistic competition” which was found 
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Figure 10.—The processing deck of the factory ship Slava. Photo: I. P. Golovlev.
everywhere in the Soviet Union, and in 
particular in the whaling industry.
Beginning from the second season of 
the Slava, the fleet created two flensing 
teams, operating in shifts of 12 h each. 
These teams competed constantly with 
each other. At the end of a month or 
season one team would be announced 
as the winner of the socialistic com-
petition and would receive a reward 
(typically a monetary bonus as well as 
honor). The result of this competition 
was a constant increase in efficiency 
during the early years: during the 
second season on the Slava each team 
typically processed 8 to 12 whales per 
12-h shift, but by fifth season the two 
shifts could process up to 48 whales in 
24 h (Kotlyar, 1952).
This is how P.A. Kotov (Kotlyar, 
1952) described a notable day of com-
petition between flensing teams:
“On the 8th of March, Interna-
tional Women’s Day, catchers 
were reporting very large catches. 
45 whales, 50 whales, finally 71 
whales—the victorious results of 
the day. By 18:00 there were 25 
carcasses already floating behind 
the factory ship and all four tag 
boats were in line to deliver more 
whales . . . 
 “Long before the beginning 
of work, all 53 flensers came 
together on the sides of the ship 
to observe this ever-increasing 
number of carcasses, and became 
eager to begin work, and to get 
the top ranking [in their socialistic 
competition with the other shift]. 
Every 10–15 minutes a whale is 
smoothly lifted through the stern 
slip . . . It is 6:00 am and the bleak 
fall sun shows above the horizon, 
and the shifts are changing. The 
victorious results are announced: 
25½ whale carcasses were pro-
cessed [by the first shift]. This 
established a new record for Slava 
during all her years of work in the 
Antarctic . . .
 “At the beginning of the second 
shift there are still 20 whales by the 
stern slipway of the factory ship. 
This is a chance for the other team 
to take the lead. The second shift is 
working with high intensity, like a 
well-regulated mechanism but . . . 
one of the tag boats delayed their 
carcass delivery by 20 minutes and 
so by the end of the shift at 18:00 
there are 24½ processed carcasses 
. . . . It will soon will be the end of 
the whaling season and the first 
shift will become the winner of the 
competition . . .” 
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Figure 11.—A blue whale on the stern slipway of the factory ship Slava. Photo:  
I. P. Golovlev.
The processing capacity of a factory 
ship greatly depended upon the spe-
cies of whale concerned. In a single 
day on the huge Sovetskaya Ukraina, 
the flensing teams could process up to 
200 small sperm whales, 100 hump-
back whales, or 30–35 pygmy blue 
whales.19
After a whale was dismantled on 
the flensing deck, the next part of the 
process involved the blubber-boiling 
factory, which had its own competi-
tions. Here, problems arose: when 
large numbers of whales were killed, 
the flensing teams could not process 
all of them before they turned rotten, 
or whales were sometimes delivered in 
an already-rotten state due to extended 
towing. These whales were lifted on 
deck, and measured and recorded (and 
thus were included in gross production 
results). However, while the blubber 
was still often stripped and processed, 
the rest of the whale was thrown over-
board unused. Sometimes carcasses 
were in such poor condition that after 
measuring they were thrown overboard 
completely intact, without even the 
blubber taken from them. In some pe-
riods, only the blubber was taken from 
even fresh whales, because the storage 
space for bone-meal was already full, 
or if there were too many carcasses 
awaiting processing. In such cases, 
even large blue whales were stripped of 
blubber and thrown overboard. The pro-
cesses, machinery, and other technical 
equipment used by the Soviet whaling 
industry are described in great detail for 
factory ships, catchers, and cargo ships 
by Bodrov and Grigoriev (1963).
Whale Products
For many years, from 1933 until at 
least the end of 1952, the main whal-
ing product was whale oil. All whale 
meat was either boiled to extract the oil 
or processed into fertilizer, with some 
amount reserved for canning. Only 
later did Soviet whaling begin to utilize 
baleen whale meat (frozen or canned) 
for human consumption.20
All bones were loaded into boilers 
to extract the oil or were processed as 
bone-meal. A number of different prod-
ucts were made from whales depending 
on the species and condition of the car-
cass. Baleen whales that were processed 
fresh were used for human consumption 
as frozen and canned meat, and oil used 
to make margarine. Sperm whales were 
processed into industrial oil and bone-
meal. In addition, medicinal products 
were sometimes derived for use in the 
medical industry and in hospitals. Whale 
liver was processed separately (it was 
typically salted and stored) to extract 
vitamin A later. Some effort was made 
to develop methods to extract hormones 
from the pancreas and other organs, 
but this was never accomplished on an 
industrial scale.
Baleen whale products were destined 
largely for human consumption, while 
the products taken from sperm whales 
were primarily consigned for indus-
trial use or animal food. As a result, 
after sperm whales were processed, 
the regulations required all processing 
lines of the blubber-boiling factory to 
be cleaned before any baleen whales 
were processed. In later years, especially 
in the North Pacific, when the number 
of baleen whales caught represented a 
small proportion of the total catch (rela-
tive to sperm whales, the primary target) 
these occasional mysticetes would be 
processed together with sperm whales 
for bone-meal and industrial oil.
Whale oil and other products (except 
for meat, which was kept in freezers) 
were stored in tanks; these huge reser-
voirs each had a capacity of 500–600 
20Bodrov and Grigoriev (1963) list different 
kinds of canned whale meat and also give recipes 
for sausage ingredients as well as ways to cook 
whale meat and liver.
19Some of the Soviet catch data were questioned 
by Japanese scientists on the basis that so many 
whales could not be processed in the time avail-
able (IWC, 2006, p. 151–152). However, it 
should be noted that the Japanese factory ships 
processed whale carcasses far more thoroughly 
and for many more products than did the Soviets 
who, in some years or periods, took only blub-
ber. At times of especially high catches such as 
in the 1959–60 and 1960–61 Antarctic whaling 
seasons, more than 100 humpback whales could 
potentially be processed in a day if just the blub-
ber was stripped.
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GT. These tanks contained, at different 
times, fuel, diesel, whale oil, bone-meal, 
water, or salted liver. They were thor-
oughly washed before each change of 
contents. Periodically, a supply tanker 
would arrive and all whale products 
were transhipped, thus freeing up space 
for new whale products.
Whaling Fleet Mechanical Equipment
Overall, the Soviet whaling fleets 
represented a large capital investment. 
Beginning with the Slava after World 
War II, each factory fleet had modern 
equipment designed for catching and 
processing whales, and this machin-
ery was constantly modernized and 
improved to make all aspects of the 
whaling process more efficient (Bodrov 
and Grigoriev, 1963). As a state-owned 
industry that was free from the pressure 
to generate profits, the Soviet whaling 
industry could afford large capital out-
lays; however, it became more difficult 
to justify such expenses after catches 
dropped significantly in the early 
1970’s, and stricter controls, reduced 
catch quotas, and greater inspection 
requirements were finally established 
by the IWC.
Reporting
There was considerable bureaucracy 
involved with Soviet state industries, 
and whaling was no exception. The 
whaling fleets were required to produce 
many summary reports at the end of each 
season; these included a scientific report, 
various production reports, statistical 
reports, financial reports, reports on 
technological methods and innovations, 
whaling inspection reports, injury and 
safety reports, and reports on activities 
related to the work of the Communist 
Party.
Catch numbers given in the various 
reports for a single season of one whal-
ing fleet sometimes differ significantly. 
A good example concerns reports for 
the Vladivostok fleet in 1968, which 
illegally killed 127 bowhead whales 
in the Okhotsk Sea. The scientific 
report and whaling inspector’s report 
give the same numbers, including the 
133 bowheads together with 182 fin 
whales and 37 sei whales; by contrast, 
the production report does not mention 
bowheads at all, and instead gives 260 
fin whales and 106 sei whales. It is not 
clear why the production reports some-
times include clearly falsified data; this 
was apparently an attempt to cover up 
illegal catches, but this is odd given that 
production reports (like everything else) 
were classified as secret. In other cases 
(for example, the material we have ex-
amined for the Sovetskaya Rossia fleet), 
catch numbers in all of the reports agree.
Transit and Foreign Ports
Soviet whaling cruises averaged 7–8 
mo. The fleets working in the Antarctic 
typically left their home ports in Sep-
tember or the beginning of October, 
and returned in May. While in transit to 
the Antarctic, a fleet would sometimes 
stop to whale illegally in the trop-
ics. Examples include the Sovetskaya 
Ukraina and the Slava, which left from 
Odessa on the Black Sea and pursued 
a route through the Mediterranean and 
the Suez Canal and on into the Red Sea; 
both fleets hunted humpbacks and other 
whales in the Arabian Sea in 1965–66 
(Mikhalev, 1997) before continuing 
south to the Antarctic. During transit, 
everyone earned only their basic salary, 
even if they were actually whaling; the 
salary coefficients noted above applied 
only from the official start (as set by 
IWC regulations) of the whaling season 
in the Antarctic.
When a fleet entered a foreign port, 
crew members were given shore leave. 
However, they were divided into groups 
of three or four, with the requirement 
that one of the members must be a Com-
munist Party member or an officer, who 
was responsible for ensuring that the 
crew members behaved appropriately 
and did not attempt to defect. The over-
all intent during such port visits was to 
portray Soviet people as orderly, happy, 
friendly citizens of a great country. 
Bad behavior on shore was severely 
punished. In extreme cases, the much-
coveted seaman’s passport—the docu-
ment that allowed men and women to go 
to sea—would be taken away; without 
this, one could not work on a ship, or 
earn the (relatively) lucrative seaman’s 
salary. On the return voyage at the end of 
the whaling season, the crew would be 
instructed on how to respond if anyone 
should ask how many whale catches had 
been made. 
Science
Scientists were a regular part of the 
whaling fleet crew from the inception 
of Soviet whaling. Beginning with the 
Aleut’s operations in the Far East, the 
scientific research goal was to discover 
whaling areas that could support high 
catches. In addition, scientists were 
employed to conduct research on the 
whales, their prey, and their environ-
ment to better predict whale distribution 
and thus improve the efficiency and re-
sults of the whaling endeavor. As noted 
earlier, whale biologists were working 
on each factory ship, with a few excep-
tions. There were also usually one or two 
oceanographers on board, and catcher 
captains also collected data on weather 
and oceanography whenever possible. 
Technicians working in the factory 
ship’s chemistry lab were charged with 
storing products derived from the pro-
cessing of whales, and analyzing their 
quality (e.g. the pH of whale oil and the 
quality of this oil and of bone-meal).
In the daily regime, two whale biolo-
gists would alternate working in 12-h 
shifts alongside the flensing teams. In 
addition to the primary information re-
corded in the whaling journal on the pro-
cessing deck, they would collect detailed 
biological data, to be analyzed in studies 
of population abundance, structure, and 
dynamics. Alone, or with an assistant, 
they would take measurements of differ-
ent parts of the whale’s body, cut out ear 
plugs (for age determination), measure 
and preserve embryos, ovaries, and 
testes, and collect tissue samples from 
other organs, as well as parasites and 
stomach contents. All this information 
was initially recorded in a small field 
notebook, and at the end of the shift the 
scientist would copy it into a scientific 
(whaling) journal and ensure that all 
samples taken were clearly recorded.
Based on scientific journals and the 
whale passports (which were transferred 
at the end of the season to the research 
institutes concerned), scientists began 
to analyze the data on the return voyage 
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from the whaling grounds and prepared 
a scientific report of the voyage; two or 
three copies of this were archived with 
the home institute and with the Fisheries 
Ministry. According to the rules, whale 
passports were kept only for a few 
months, until data analyses were com-
plete and reports were prepared; after 
this, they were destroyed (usually by 
burning). As a result of this requirement, 
all of the original detailed information 
was largely lost. The major exception 
was the retention of more than 57,000 
passports from the Yuriy Dolgorukiy 
factory fleet, representing a complete 
record of 15 years of whaling. These 
were secretly preserved by the biologist 
Dmitry Tormosov, who regarded the 
destruction of this material as an unac-
ceptable waste of original data.
The system of target setting was not 
without its critics. As noted above, the 
recommendations of scientists with 
regard to the (lack of) sustainability of 
high catch levels were routinely ignored 
when setting production targets, and one 
can read the frustrations of some scien-
tists in some of the annual reports that 
they were required to produce. Klumov, 
in his formerly secret preliminary report 
of the 1956 whaling season (Klumov, 
1956; Ivashchenko et al., 2007) says: 
“I think that the whaling plan 
established for 1957 with a target 
of 47,000 tons of raw products is 
overestimated and does not reflect 
the real condition of whale popula-
tions in the area around the Kuril 
Islands. The assumption that in 
1957 the whaling fleet could take 
2,000 whales is unrealistic for the 
industry working with whaling 
products, and will force whaling 
ships to take whales that are not 
of full value in terms of the busi-
ness.21 Statistics for the previous 
years of whaling around the Kurils 
show that the number of full-value 
sperm whales taken never reached 
1,000 (not including 1952 and 
possibly 1956, for which we do 
not yet have complete data), but 
instead ranged from 780 to 950 
whales per year. In other words, 
all other important details of our 
work are ignored. Evidently we 
have too great an abundance of 
natural resources, so we can waste 
them and manage them so poorly.”
Another example comes from the 
combined report of the scientific groups 
from the fleets Dalniy Vostok and Vladi-
vostok for 1967 (Latishev et al., 1967):
“At the current time, whaling in 
the northern waters of the Pacific 
Ocean is going through a very dif-
ficult time. The resources declined 
so dramatically in the last three 
years that the industry already now 
has to cut back the production plan 
targets for catches.
 “Mainly this situation relates 
to the catches of the most prefer-
able baleen whales. Despite some 
increase in the amount of catches 
of baleen whales during the last 
[1967] season (8.7% of the total 
catch in 1967 vs. 6.3% in 1966), 
this happened only because of large 
catches of right and gray whales. 
In future seasons the percentage of 
baleen whales in the catch would 
not exceed 5% (in number of ani-
mals) of the total no matter what 
the effort. 
 “In particular, populations of 
blue and humpback whales are 
greatly reduced, even though these 
whales were so numerous in the 
recent past. The whaling value of 
a number of large areas has been 
completely lost: the Gulf of Alaska, 
the Bering Sea and the waters 
around the Aleutian islands.
 “From 1964, the whaling fo-
cused its efforts completely on 
the sperm whales that inhabit the 
Central and Western regions and 
around the Kuril Islands. In these 
areas sperm whale groups consist 
primarily (sometimes up to 95%) 
of females, the reproductive part of 
the population that defines its abun-
dance. Annually our whaling fleets 
kill more than 10,000–12,000 of 
these kind of sperm whales, while 
the size of the majority of them is 
below that allowed for whaling. 
In the 1967 season the number of 
undersized whales caught by the 
Dalniy Vostok and Vladivostok 
fleets made up 72% and 86% of 
their total catch, respectively. If 
one adds to that amount the number 
of illegal baleen whales (right, 
gray, blue and humpback whales), 
and also small-sized sei and fin 
whales, the picture of modern 
whaling appears in a very bad light.
 “This is only from the point of 
view of international law. What 
about biological conclusions re-
garding the condition of exploited 
populations?
 “Analysis of biological data by 
scientific groups for a number of 
years proves the poor condition 
of extremely depleted popula-
tions of some species (right, blue, 
humpback) and predicts a similar 
future for others (fin, sei and sperm 
whales).”
Such warnings notwithstanding, 
Soviet whaling continued apace, often 
until populations were commercially 
exhausted.
Inspections and  
Falsification of Catch Data
As noted above, each whaling fleet 
was required by the IWC to carry a 
national inspector whose job it was 
to enforce international regulations. 
Within the Soviet whaling industry, the 
absurdity of this inspection system lay 
in the way in which it was structured. 
The inspector was appointed by the 
ministry in charge of whaling (initially 
the Ministry of Food and Light Industry 
of the U.S.S.R. and later by the Fisher-
ies Ministry); as a result, even if he 
was not under the direct command of 
the fleet captain, the whaling inspector 
was nonetheless employed by the same 
agency which paid his salary, as well as 
those of all the whalers.
Certainly, captains could create prob-
lems for any principled inspector, who 
in doing his job properly would be at 
odds with the crew’s continual desire 
for bonuses; needless to say, it would not 
21In other words, undersized whales below the 
legal limit established by the IWC.
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be easy for an inspector to spend several 
months confined to a factory ship in such 
a potentially hostile atmosphere (indeed, 
this is often a fundamental weakness 
of all observer programs for whaling, 
fisheries, or any similar industry). How-
ever, it is not clear whether inspectors 
ever truly attempted to follow the IWC 
regulations, or whether they existed 
solely so that the U.S.S.R. could claim 
to have fulfilled this requirement, with 
no intention of true compliance.
There are examples of reports sub-
mitted by national inspectors at the end 
of a whaling season where inspectors 
apparently attempted to stop illegal 
whaling. For example, an inspector’s 
report from 1968 noted that the Vladivo-
stok fleet was hunting bowhead whales 
(a protected species) in the Okhotsk 
Sea in September; the report notes that 
the inspector cabled the ministry in 
Moscow to inform them of this infrac-
tion, and requested that the captain 
leave the area. There was no immediate 
response from the ministry, and the cap-
tain continued the whaling for another 
two weeks until the ministry finally 
ordered him to desist. The same report 
lists various other infractions, as well 
as the fines levied by the ministry on 
captains and harpooners. However, the 
fines concerned were relatively small: 
869 whales were reported as infractions 
(either undersized, protected species, 
or lactating individuals), but only 91 
fines were levied. These involved 21 
individuals for a total of 1,540 roubles 
(approximately $3,700 at 1968 ex-
change rates, or an average of $176 
per person).22
The whaling inspector together with 
the Engineer of Whaling was respon-
sible for writing reports on the season’s 
results, which were then sent to the 
ministry in Moscow. The need for large 
catches to meet plan targets, and to 
provide the benefits and bonuses desired 
by workers, conflicted in an obvious and 
fundamental way with the U.S.S.R.’s 
obligations under the ICRW to follow 
the whaling regulations established by 
the IWC. This was solved through falsi-
fied reports, which gave catch totals that 
were lower than those actually achieved. 
This reporting system is discussed fur-
ther below, and a summary of reported 
vs. actual catches for the Antarctic is 
given in Table 3.
Although inspectors sometimes at-
tempted to stop some illegal whaling (as 
above), for the most part this seems not 
to have been the case. Indeed, one in-
spector’s report (that for the 1967 season 
of the Dalniy Vostok fleet, extracts of 
which are reproduced here in the Ap-
pendix) opens by stating the main duties 
of the inspection team, which consisted 
of two contradictory objectives:
“The main task of the State Inspec-
tion [Department] was assisting 
with fulfilment of the State plan 
targets for gross output and spe-
cific products, and to decrease the 
number of violations of whaling 
regulations.”
The report notes that the fleet was 
ordered to enter the Okhotsk Sea in 
September 1967, in part because they 
had failed to fulfill the monthly pro-
duction target for August. There, they 
found aggregations of North Pacific 
right whales (a protected species) on 
the eastern coast of Sakhalin Island, and 
killed 126 animals. The whaling there 
was sufficiently good that they greatly 
exceeded the monthly production target. 
The following month they continued 
to whale illegally, killing many sperm 
whale mothers and calves. Significantly, 
the inspector’s report is quite explicit 
about the reason for this whaling:
“If the fleet had strictly followed the 
“Regulations” the yearly plan target 
would not have been fulfilled.”
The report concludes by listing fines 
levied for infractions, which involved 
only a small minority of the illegal 
catches (e.g. only one of 132 right 
whales taken during the whole season). 
From other reports, we believe that the 
only infractions that were punished—
and then only occasionally—were those 
involving lactating females or calves, or 
sometimes under-sized animals; the fact 
that a catch involved a species protected 
by IWC does not seem to have been suf-
ficient to trigger punishment. Extracts 
from the full report, which provides an 
excellent example of the problems with 
the Soviet inspection system, are given 
in the Appendix.
The specifics of the national inspec-
tion system are not easy to understand 
for people who are unfamiliar with the 
Soviet system of planning and control, 
or with the whaling industry and its 
rules. To begin with, all true information 
(journals and reports) was classified as 
secret. None of the information or data 
analyses pertaining to illegal catches 
could be published, either inside or 
outside the country. As a result, even 
doctoral dissertations based on whaling 
data were classified as secret (Dmitriy 
Tormosov, personal commun., October, 
2008).
In the absence of real inspection 
procedures, accurate information (such 
as species, length, and biological pa-
rameters) about whales caught was 
freely recorded in the whaling journals 
on the catchers and factory ships. As 
noted above, catch and biological 
information would be recorded in the 
whale passports, in whaling journals on 
the processing deck, and in scientists’ 
journals. During the whaling season, a 
whaling inspector and the Engineer of 
Whaling would, on a daily or weekly 
basis, “clean” the catch data by delet-
ing all protected species or replacing 
them with falsified records of fin, sei, or 
22According to a financial report for one of the 
whaling fleets for 1964, the average annual 
salary (without bonuses) for all personnel was 
3,600 rubles (about $8,600), and would have 
been considerably higher than this for captains 
and harpooners.
Table 3.—Total catches for all Soviet whaling fleets 
in Antarctic, 1946–1986, by species. Source: Allison 
(2010). Note that actual catch totals are in some cases 
substantially larger than those reported by Yablokov 
et al. (1998) and by Clapham and Baker (2002); they 
reflect the most up-to-date accounting by the IWC.
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minke whales23, and deleting all records 
of lactating females and calves as well as 
undersized whales (those whose length 
fell below the minimum legal length 
established by IWC). Whales that were 
legal but that were killed in prohibited 
areas or time periods also disappeared 
from the official record submitted to 
the Bureau of International Whaling 
Statistics (BIWS).
Falsification of the data happened not 
only after, but also occasionally during, 
the processing of whales. Sometimes 
when a whale was a little below the legal 
size its length was recorded as 0.5 or 1.0 
m longer (animals who fell far short of 
the limit were removed from the record 
completely). That solved the problem of 
undersized whales, but it created another 
in terms of production figures, which 
were calculated based upon standardized 
length-weight tables; to compensate, 
larger whales were sometimes recorded 
as shorter than they actually were (Ve-
inger, personal commun., November, 
2009; Derviz, personal commun., Oc-
tober, 2008).
While these changes may appear 
insignificant, the resulting scientific 
analyses could show a strange and 
disproportionate distribution of catches 
by length: the absence of under-sized 
whales, a spike of whales with lengths 
just above the legal minimum and again 
fewer whales of the next size group. 
Furthermore, all of the other biological 
parameters for these same whales were 
recorded exactly as they were measured, 
creating even more confusion (Veinger, 
personal commun., November, 2009). It 
was such discrepancies in the later years 
of the Soviet whaling industry that led 
Mikhalev (2009) to discover that falsifi-
cation of catch data was occurring even 
after the implementation by the IWC 
in 1972 of an International Observer 
Scheme (see below).24
At the end of the season all catch 
data would be edited in the same way, 
primarily by the Engineer of Whaling 
and the whaling inspector but sometimes 
by a special group that also included 
fleet scientists. All Southern Hemisphere 
baleen whale catches above lat. 40°S 
would be removed, as were records of 
lactating females and calves, protected 
species, and undersized whales (with 
the exception of a few “infractions” to 
make the data look more realistic). The 
data were then sent, together with sci-
entific reports summarizing the whaling 
season, to the Ministry of Fisheries in 
Moscow, where the information from 
the various fleets and/or land stations 
was coordinated prior to submission of 
the falsified record to BIWS. All of these 
reports and data remained classified as 
secret until the 1990’s.
There is some disagreement among 
our sources regarding reporting. A 
former whaling biologist and inspector 
stated that the fleets sometimes sent 
falsified catch data directly to BIWS 
(Dmitriy Tormosov, personal commun., 
October, 2008). However, others dis-
agree and maintain that everything was 
coordinated through the ministry in 
Moscow. The latter seems more likely, 
given the necessity to ensure that the 
combined catch totals from all fleets 
did not exceed the allowable quota for 
legal species.
After 1972
In 1972, after many years of discus-
sion, the IWC finally implemented the 
International Observer Scheme (IOS). 
This was first proposed by Norway in 
1955 (IWC, 1956) and—for reasons 
which are now obvious—met with 
considerable resistance, notably from 
the U.S.S.R. The development and 
eventual implementation of the IOS is 
beyond the scope of this paper; however, 
some of the wording in the IOS agree-
ment provides a clearer understanding 
of the position of independent observers 
on board a whaling fleet. The full text 
of the Agreement concerning an inter-
national observer scheme for factory 
ships engaged in pelagic whaling in 
the Antarctic is given in the Appendix 
to the Chairman’s report of the fifteenth 
meeting (IWC, 1965), and includes this 
language regarding the “Rights and 
Functions of Observers”:
“An observer shall be enabled to 
observe freely the operations of 
the expedition . . . shall be given 
facilities to ascertain the species, 
size, sex and number of whales 
taken . . . All reports required and 
all records and data shall be made 
freely and immediately available 
to observers for examination . . .”
In light of these instructions, for 
many years it was widely assumed that 
since introduction of the IOS in 1972, 
there could be no falsification of data or 
illegal catches. However, this assump-
tion has recently been shown to be false. 
Mikhalev et al. (2009) presented a paper 
to the IWC Scientific Committee on fal-
sification of catch data relating to minke 
whales taken after 1972 by the whaling 
fleet Sovetskaya Ukraina; these catches 
were made despite the presence on 
board of inspectors from Japan. Those 
authors provide an example of how (and 
why) this falsification occurred:
“In the data (for example), instead 
of 3–4 minke whales only 2–3 were 
recorded, and their lengths were 
overstated. The reason behind 
this relates to the way the system 
worked, which can be explained as 
follows. There was a catch quota, 
but the Soviet Ministry of Fisher-
ies gave a production plan target 
for products that was completely 
different; the latter was calculated 
based upon tables of weights by 
length of the killed whales, but this 
table was unrealistically optimistic 
and did not account for thin or 
rotten animals. The difficult way 
to meet production quotas was 
to try to find whales of sufficient 
size to make enough products. The 
easier way was to kill 3 minke 
whales and report them as 2 larger 
ones; the additional whales killed 
but not recorded were referred to 
aboard the factory fleets as “green 
whales”. There were also “air 
whales”, which were whales that 
23Fin, sei, and minke whales were in most cases 
legally catchable, and therefore false records of 
these species could be used to explain the prod-
ucts obtained by the factory fleets. This is why 
some of the reported figures in Table 2 are higher 
than the actual catch. 
24It is our impression from interviews of former 
biologists that, with the exception of some post-
1972 data from Antarctic fleets, such falsification 
was rare; the great majority of the biological data 
that are available for Soviet catches are accurate.
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were not caught but were recorded 
to meet catch-by-area targets, or to 
reconcile the total products with a 
number of whales that could con-
ceivably make up such products. 
This procedure involved a fine 
line, because they did not want 
to create a situation in which the 
Ministry would set a higher target 
the following year based upon 
what was reported in the current 
season”.
The violations reported by Mikhalev 
et al. (2009) referred to only one fac-
tory fleet, the Sovetskaya Ukraina, but 
they noted that it was likely that the 
“practice of illegal whaling and data 
falsification [after 1972] were common 
in other Soviet fleets as well.” They 
also noted that all of the IOS inspectors 
on Soviet whaling fleets were from the 
Japanese whaling industry, and because 
Japan was at the time buying whale 
meat from Soviet vessels, it was in the 
interests of some of these inspectors to 
turn a blind eye to the practice. Also, 
on some occasions when illegal whales 
were being brought to the factory ship 
for processing, inspectors were invited 
into an officer’s cabin and treated to 
“hospitality” involving food and much 
vodka, thus ensuring that they would 
not be on the processing deck when the 
whales arrived. Presumably, inspectors 
would be shown falsified records after 
the whales had been disposed of, but this 
aspect is not clear.
In summary, the IOS appears to have 
been subverted through a combination 
of deception and observer complicity.
Catch Totals
It is not our intention here to report 
detailed catch totals for Soviet whal-
ing. For the Southern Hemisphere, 
these have been published elsewhere 
(Yablokov, 1995; Zemsky et al., 1995, 
1996; Yablokov et al., 1998; Mikhalev, 
2000, 2004; Clapham and Baker, 2002), 
although substantially new figures 
are reported in Table 3. North Pacific 
totals are in the process of being esti-
mated from previously unanalyzed data 
(Ivashchenko, unpublished) and will be 
published separately.
However, we can give a brief sum-
mary of what is known to date. During 
more than 30 years of whaling in the 
Antarctic, the U.S.S.R. reported 185,778 
whales taken but actually killed at least 
338,336, a difference of more than 
150,000 animals (Table 3, and Allison, 
2010). Large gaps remain in the record 
for the North Pacific. The scope of the 
whaling there was smaller, but from 
provisional data we estimate that at least 
30,000 whales were killed illegally in 
this ocean, where the major discrepancy 
between reported and actual catches in-
volved sperm whales. Overall, we judge 
that the U.S.S.R. killed approximately 
180,000 whales illegally, and caused a 
number of population crashes.
Two such crashes were particu-
larly obvious. Soviet catches of almost 
25,000 humpback whales in the Antarc-
tic south of Australia and New Zealand 
in 1959–61 forced the closure of the 
shore whaling stations in those two 
countries (Clapham et al., 2010). Else-
where, Soviet catches of right whales in 
the eastern North Pacific in the 1960’s 
(Doroshenko, 2000) devastated an 
already small population, which was re-
cently estimated through mark-recapture 
analysis at only 30 animals (Wade et al., 
2011). The impact of Soviet catches on 
other populations has not been fully 
assessed.
Summary
In some respects, the Soviet whaling 
industry was socially quite progressive. 
Its workers had access to often innova-
tive technology; working conditions 
were much of the time well controlled; 
and women were given equal status 
to men long before such advances 
were made in the West. Unfortunately, 
these positive characteristics were all 
overwhelmed by a system of industrial 
planning that had little basis in realistic 
resource assessments and was instead 
characterized by runaway socialistic 
competition, inefficiency, and waste. 
The result was uncontrolled whaling 
that inflicted major damage to some 
populations of whales that had already 
been depleted by “legal” whaling.
It is apparent that the U.S.S.R.’s 
campaign was not the only example 
of illegal catches or misreporting. It is 
now known (Kondo and Kasuya, 2002) 
that Japan misreported catch data from 
coastal whaling stations on two species 
(sperm whales, and Bryde’s whales, 
Balaenoptera edeni) until at least 1987. 
However, there is currently no evidence 
that such violations of IWC regulations 
were conducted at the same scale as 
those practiced by the U.S.S.R., or 
that they were the manifestations of a 
planned system of deception authorized 
at the highest levels of government.
For most of the post-war era, the man-
agement of commercial whaling was a 
colossal failure (Holt, 2007). Although 
the widespread violations conducted 
by the U.S.S.R. were arguably the 
worst example of this mismanagement, 
the blame for the depletion of whale 
populations worldwide cannot be laid 
solely at the door of the Soviet system. 
The repeated failure of the IWC to 
acknowledge evidence of declining 
populations, and the relative ease with 
which member states could successfully 
negotiate unrealistically high quotas or 
block progressive proposals, provided 
a recipe for disaster that was only ex-
acerbated by the secret actions of the 
U.S.S.R.. In short, the Soviet system 
was not the only “devil” involved in the 
business of whaling.
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The main task of the State Inspec-
tion [Department] was assisting with 
fulfilment of the State plan targets for 
gross output and specific products, and 
to decrease the number of violations of 
whaling regulations. 
For some time during the beginning 
of the whaling season, when no inspec-
tors were present, the administration 
of the factory ship practiced incorrect 
recording of undersized whales by 
converting some of them into a lower 
number of legal-sized whales, with a 
decrease in reported weight. Inspectors 
warned that this practice is unaccept-
able, and it ceased. 
In official reports the tendency was 
developing towards decreasing blub-
ber thickness, increasing body length, 
and changing species. For example: an 
undersized fin whale would turn into a 
legal-sized sei whale; a prohibited blue 
whale into a fin whale; a right whale into 
two humpback whales, etc.
This created significant complications 
in the documentation, and reports from 
the fleet administration and State Inspec-
tion are significantly different from each 
other in terms of total catch, and also by 
species composition, sex and length.
At the end of July the decision was 
made to go along the Kurils with a 
possibility to go deep into the Okhotsk 
Sea where Aleut has been working 
successfully. 
In early September a scout vessel was 
sent to survey areas around southern 
Sakhalin Island, and there found aggre-
gations of right whales. Based on nu-
merous requests to increase production 
from baleen whales, and also to cover 
the unfulfilled target for August, the fleet 
headed there immediately . . . In one week 
the whole aggregation that was stretched 
along the eastern coast of Sakhalin 
was killed . . . Because of this excellent 
catch the targets for products were ex-
ceeded by 47.2% and the monthly gross 
output target was exceeded by 69.4%.
Conclusions for work in October: 
During the month mostly unconven-
tional [illegal under the Convention 
regulations] sperm whales were killed, 
including a large number of lactating 
females and calves . . . A record was set 
relative to the plan target for catches and 
production.
Violations during the season:
There was a constant requirement for 
the fleet command to increase the catch 
of baleen whales . . . After a categori-
cal order to go into the Bering Sea, the 
fleet hunted fin whales, the majority of 
which were under-sized or lactating. In 
the Gulf of Anadyr the catch switched 
to gray whales. Only bad weather and a 
large distance to the factory ship (which 
was transferring products to the cargo 
ships) prevented additional prohibited 
catches of gray whales.
The necessity to increase production 
from baleen whales and compensate for 
the unfulfilled catch target in August 
forced the fleet to hunt right whales in 
the middle of September.
In total, illegal whales represented 
68.3% of whales by number, and 48.6% 
by weight . . . If the fleet had strictly fol-
lowed the “Regulations” the yearly plan 
target would not have been fulfilled.
In the end, for the 618 illegal whales 
taken (9,397 tons of raw weight), the 
total amount of fines levied was 780 
rubles, which included warnings and 
fines for: 0 blue whales [out of 43 taken], 
5 fin whales [of 120], 6 sei whales [of 
145], 7 humpback whales [of 36], 586 
sperm whales [of 4,495], 13 gray whales 
[of 124] and 1 right whale [of 132].
